Introduction
The legality of the separation fence (also called "barrier" and "wall"  ) constructed by Israel on the West Bank as a means of preventing terrorist acts committed by the Palestinians has been examined by two different Courts. Three different decisions have been delivered in regard to it: a) the Advisory Opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on July 9, 2004, at the request of the UN General Assembly,  on the question of "the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem" (hereinafter: ICJ); 
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All three decisions differ in their conclusions. The ICJ concluded that the whole separation fence, insofar as it was constructed on the occupied territory of the West Bank, violated international humanitarian and human rights law. In contrast, the HCJ ruled in Beit Surik -where one segment of the fence passing northwest to Jerusalem was discussed -that the construction of the fence was legitimate based on military-security grounds, but invalidated most of its route on the grounds of the disproportionate harm caused to the Palestinian inhabitants of the area. In Alfei Menashe, the HCJ confirmed its previous ruling on the legality of the construction of the fence, but ordered an alteration of its route around the Israeli settlement of Alfei Menashe (located on the West Bank, near the town of Qalqiliya), so as to leave the five petitioning Palestinian villages (or part of them) outside the fence, on the grounds that the enclave created by the fence caused them extensive injury.
In Alfei Menashe, the HCJ also responded to the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on several points, determining that although it will grant full weight to the rules of international law as stated by the ICJ, the Advisory Opinion is not res judicata and does not obligate the HCJ to rule that all segments of the fence violate international law. The HCJ opined that the differences in the conclusions reached by it and the ICJ stemmed mainly from the different factual bases laid before either Court: while the ICJ was mainly provided with information regarding the injury that the fence caused to the Palestinian residents of the area in dispute (following Israel's refusal to participate in the Advisory Opinion proceedings  ), the HCJ also had before it factual data on Israel's security-military needs that it used in its conclusions.
Yet, the HCJ pointed out in Alfei Menashe that despite the different outcomes of the ICJ's Advisory Opinion and the Beit Sourik Case, the "basic normative foundation upon which the ICJ and the Supreme Court in Beit Sourik based their decisions was a common one" on a number of issues, including: the status of the West Bank; annexation of an occupied territory; application of the 1907 Hague Regulations  and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention;  application of Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague Regulations and Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; application of human rights conventions to the occupied territory; infringement of the Palestinian residents' rights by the construction of the fence, and application of the exceptions of military necessity, national security requirements, or public order (para. 57). Nevertheless, some commentators have asserted
